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ANOTHER MOMENT IN THE EVOLUTION
OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY POWER: THE
OPINION IN SCHULTZ V. SPRINGFIELD FOREST
PRODUCTS
By Drew K. Mahady*
I. INTRODUCTION
Delegations of power to administrative agencies are common.
Generally, Congress will establish a policy and order an administrative
agency to promulgate the means most likely to obtain the desired end.
The empowered agency is often granted the ability to promulgate rules
and regulations which have the same force of law as congressionally
enacted statutes.I The courts have assisted the legislature in
legitimizing administrative acts by regularly supporting the actions and
methods imposed by administrative agencies.2 In fact, there have been
only two instances where the Supreme Court has invalidated a
Congressional delegation of power to an administrative body.3 The end
result of these unique delegations of power is called administrative
law.4
One of the most recent judicial decisions granting additional
powers to the agency system occurred in Oregon.5 The Court of
Appeals of Oregon held that an agency board has the power to review
*Second year law student, Loyola University Chicago, School of Law.
'PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 44 (9th ed. 1995).
2NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 64 S.Ct. 851, 88 L.Ed. 1170
(1944) (stating that "where the question is one of specific application of a broad statutory term
in a proceeding in which the agency administrating the statute must determine it initially, the
reviewing court's function is limited); Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 62 S.Ct. 326, 86 L.Ed.
301 (1941) (ruling that an administrative body conclusion will be left untouched); Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81
L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) (holding that when the language of Congress is unclear, an agency
interpretation of a statute must be given great deference).3Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S.Ct. 241, 79 L.Ed. 446 (1935);
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct. 837, 79 L.Ed. 1570
(1935).
4Administrative law is defined as "law created by administrative agencies by way of
rules, regulations, orders, and decisions. BARRONS LAW DICTIONARY 12 (1996).
5Schultz v. Springfield Forest Products, 141 Or.App. 727, 951 P.2d 169 (1997).
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the validity of a director's rule to ensure compliance with the applicable
statute or constitution.6 This decision comes at the heels of several
court decisions that expanded an administrative law judge's power to
include the ability to address the constitutionality of an agency rule or
policy.7
This note begins with a short discussion of the development of
the agency system and the evolution of agency powers. This note then
turns its attention to the facts and procedural history of the Schultz case.
We will then focus on the Court of Appeals' decision to expand an
agency power and its reasons supporting such an expansion. Next, this
note analyses the scant reasoning provided by the Court of Appeals
with a focus on the recent Oregon Supreme Court's decision to allow
administrative law judges to address constitutional challenges. This
note ends with a discussion of the potential impact of Schultz and a
brief conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND
On its face the Constitution arguably prohibits Congress from
delegating its legislative power.8 Additionally, the Constitution places
a restriction on the judiciary, requiring that the courts be "necessary. '
These prohibitions and limitations reflect the drafters' intent to create
a system containing adequate checks and balances."0 Nowhere does the
Constitution mention smaller, specialized entities empowered with the
ability to legislate and adjudicate. However, with minuscule textual
support from the Constitution, the presence and influence of
6Id. at 731.
'Marykay Foy, Note, The Authority of the Administrative Agency to Decide
Constitutional Issues: Richardson v. Tennessee Board of Dentistry, 17 J. NAALJ 173, 186-188
(1997).
8U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ( "All legislative power herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the U.S. shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.").
9U.S. CONST. art. III, § I ( "The judicial Power of the U.S., shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish."). This particular argument against administrative agencies was "decided" over half
a century ago by the New Jersey Supreme Court when it held that agency adjudications do not
fall under the "inferior courts" provision of the Federal Constitution. Mulhearn v. Federal
Shipbuilding Co., 66 A.2d 726 (N.J. 1949).
'
0GERALD GUNTHER et al., CONSTTmONAL LAW 354 (13th ed. 1997).
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administrative agencies is undeniable.
Common law systems have always needed and employed
administrative bureaus and boards and commissions." The industrial
revolution and growth of the railroad in the United States spurred the
need for many specialized regulatory entities.' 2 Agencies were
essential in the early 1900's to the nation's growth and stability. 3 At
that time there was a strong desire to insulate administrative actions
from judicial review whenever it was constitutionally feasible. 4
Several decades later, Roosevelt's aggressive New Deal's distributional
programs were brought to life through administrative agencies.' 5
In 1946, Congress enacted the Administrative Procedures Act. 6
The Administrative Procedures Act ("APA") codified the means by
which an agency could both legislate and adjudicate.17 Several
provisions provided for broad agency discretion and unreviewable
decision making power.'" Shortly thereafter the Atomic Energy
Commission was created, establishing the international scope of
administrative agencies.' 9
Several court decisions evince the evolution and growth of the
agency system since the passage of the APA. According to Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation v. National Resources Defense
Council, Inc., courts cannot impose additional procedural requirements
to those contained in the APA for rulemaking upon an agency.20
Morrison v. Oldon confirmed the position that the President does not
"ROSCOE POUND, The Place of Administration in the Legal System, in
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: ITS GROWTH, PROCEDURE AND SIGNIFICANCE 1, 8 (1942).
i2CARROW, MILTON, THE BACKGROUND OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1 (1948).
13ROSCOE POUND, The Rise ofAdministrative Justice, in Administrative Law: ITS
GROWTH, PROCEDURE AND SIGNIFICANCE 27, 28 (1942). During the early 1900's many
statutes established administrative tribunals to eliminate the delay and expense encountered
when regulating public utilities.
141d.
5ROBERT RABIN, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, in FOUNDATION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY READERS IN LAW 39, 40 (Peter H. Schuck 1994).
16ADMINSTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 5 U.S.C. § 500 (1996).
171d. §§ 553,.554.
181d. §§701-706.
19CARROW, MILTON, THE BACKGROUND OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1 (1948).
2 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. National Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978).
Spring 1999
XIX Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 126
possess the power to remove officers from independent agencies.2
The decision that possibly most epitomizes the growth in
agency power is Chevron, US.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.22 Chevron held that an agency rule or interpretation must
be given deference, even over and above any potentially contrary
judicial interpretation.3 An agency, when acting within the scope of its
particular specialized field, is presumed correct.24 Continuing the
ongoing trend of expanding agency powers through judicial
interpretation, several states have recently given administrative law
judges the power to rule on the constitutionality of agency regulations.25
It is important to note that the evolution of the administrative
agency system faced and still faces many opponents. Anti-agency
sentiments reached their peak in the late 1930's, as evidenced in a
report by the American Bar Association's chairman of the special
committee on administrative law.26 The attorney general during the
1980's, Edward Meese, stated "the entire system of independent
agencies is of questionable constitutionality."27 Justice Scalia continued
the constitutional construction argument by stating that, "It is difficult
2 Morrison v. Oldon, 487 U.S. 654, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988) citing
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 55 S.Ct. 869, 79 L.Ed. 1611 (1935).
22Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984).23Id.
24Id.
15Marykay Foy, Note, The Authority of the Administrative Agency to Decide
Constitutional Issues: Richardson v. Tennessee Board of Dentistry, 17 J. NAALJ 173, 186-188
(1997).
26ROBERT RABIN, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, in FOUNDATION OF
ADMINISTRATiVE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY READERS IN LAW 39, 40 (Peter H. Schuck 1994)
(excoriating the regulatory system for "administrative absolutism"). The article contained a
list of suspect "tendencies" of administrative agencies compiled by Mr. Roscoe Pound.
Included among the "tendencies" were: (1) to decide without a hearing, (2) to decide on the
basis of matters not before the tribunal, (3) to decide on the basis of pre-formed opinions, (4)
to disregard jurisdictional limits, (5) to do what will get by, and (6) to mix up rulemaking,
investigation, and prosecution, as well as the functions of advocate, judge, and enforcement
authority. 27Bernard Schwartz, "Shooting the Piano Player"? Justice Scalia and Administrative
Law, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 3 (Winter 1995) citing Howard Kurtz, Agencies Authority
Challenged, Justice Department Seems to Side with Conservatives on Regulating Power,
WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 1985, at A17. Mr. Meese urged that "we should abandon the idea that
there are such things as 'quasi-legislative' or 'quasi-judicial' functions that can be properly
delegated to independent agencies."
to imagine a principle more essential to democratic government than
that upon which the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation is founded:
Except in a few areas constitutionally committed to the Executive




In Schultz v. Springfield Forest Product, an employee, Gregory
D. Schultz, sued for a percentage increase of disability benefits.29 Mr.
Schultz fell from a ladder while working for Springfield Forest
Products as a veneer dryer feeder.30 Mr. Schultz sustained injuries to
his left elbow and his L-1 vertebra.31 The severity of these injuries
prompted Mr. Schultz to file a claim seeking permanent partial
disability.32
The amount of disability award recoverable to Mr. Schultz is
determined by a rule promulgated by the director of the Department of
Consumer and Business Services.3
B. CASE HISTORY
SAIF Corporation rendered the initial disability award The
decision by SAIF Corporation complied with the director's rule for
disability awards of the type sought by Mr. Schultz.34 The Appellate
Review Unit of the Department of Consumer and Business Services
2 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
29Schultz, 151 Or.App. at 729.301d.
311d.
32Id.
31Or. Admin. R. 436-035-0320 (5) ("A worker may be entitled to unscheduled
chronic condition impairment where a preponderance of medical opinion establishes that the
worker is unable to repetitively use a body area due to a chronic and permanent medical
condition. "Body area" means the cervical/upper thoracic spine (TI -T6)/shoulders area and
the lower thoracic spine (TT-T12)lowback/hips area. Chronic conditions in the middleback are
considered a part of the lowback/hips body area.").34Schultz, 151 Or.App. at 729-730.
Sehultz v. Sorinefield Forest Productsnrlna 1QQQ
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affirmed the award." Mr. Schultz requested a hearing to challenge the
award amount.36
Following the hearing the ALJ increased the disability award
previously determined by SAIF corporation." The ALJ held that the
director's rule was invalid and she declined to apply it because it
exceeded the director's authority.3" The ALJ opined that the rule,
which awarded unscheduled chronic condition impairment only where
the total unscheduled impairment in a body area equaled or exceeded
5%,39 was arbitrary because the scheduled chronic condition rule4
lacked such a restriction.4' SAIF Corporation sought review of the
AL's decision.42
The Worker's Compensation Board modified and reduced the
disability award granted by the AU.43 The Board reasoned that: 1)
neither the ALJ nor the Board had authority to invalidate the director's
rule, and 2) in the alternative, the rule did not exceed the director's
statutory authority to promulgate disability standards."
First, the Board looked at the applicable statutes in an attempt
to determine the authority vested in both the Director and the Board.45




39OAR 436-035-0320(5)(a) ("Unscheduled chronic condition impairment is
considered after all other unscheduled impairment within a body area, if any, has been rated
and combined under these rules. There the total unscheduled impairment within a body area
is equal to or in excess of 5%, the worker is not entitled to any unscheduled chronic condition
impairment.").
4 OAR 436-35-010(6)(a) ( "Scheduled chronic condition awards are not restricted
to instances when total impairment is less than five percent.").
4 Schultz, 151 Or.App. at 732.42Id.
43Id.
44Id.
45In the Matter of the Compensation of Gregory D. Schultz, 47 Van Natta 2265
(1995). According to statute ORS 656.726(3)(0 the Director is to "provide standards for the
evaluation of disabilities." Per ORS 656.283(7) "the Administrative Law Judge shall apply
to the hearing of the claim such standards for the evaluation of disability as may be adopted
by the director pursuant to ORS 656. 729." [Emphasis added.] Additionally, per ORS
656.295(5) "The board shall apply to the review of the claim such standards for the evaluation
of disability as may be adopted by the director pursuant to ORS 656.726." [Emphasis added.]
Director's rule.46 The Board noted that it itself also lacked any power
to ignore standards established by a Director.47
Finding no statutory supporting for the ALJ decision the Board
turned to the case cited by the claimant.4" The Welliver Welding Works
("Welliver') case involved a vocational assistance claim that had been
denied and was subsequently argued before a referee.49 The referee set
aside the director's denial of benefits because he held that the director's
rule was an invalid interpretation of the applicable statute. 0 The Board
on review affirmed the referee's decision to invalidate the director's
rule."' In distinguishing Welliver from Schultz the Board noted that at
the time of the Welliver decision there was statutory authority allowing
the Board to so invalidate a Director's rule regarding vocational
assistance.52 No such statute existed when Schultz was decided.53 In
fact, the only party authorized by statute to review a director's rule is
the director himself, subject to judicial review.54
A thoughtful dissent argues that the rule's inconsistencies
contravene the legislative intent to provide relief for all injuries suffered
during employment.55 The dissent also states that the Board should
apply the ALJ's findings and invalidate the limitation established by the
director's rule.56
C. DECISION
On December 24, 1997, the Court of Appeals of Oregon
affirmed the Worker's Compensation Board's holding that the
"Id.47Id.
"Id. citing Welliver Welding Works v. Farmen, 133 Or.App. 203, 890 P.2d 429
(1995).
49Welliver Welding Works v. Farmen, 133 Or.App. 203, 206, 890 P.2d 429 (1995).
50 d.51 d.
5247 Van Natta at 2266. ORS 656.283(2) provided the Board authority to invalidate
a director's vocational assistance rule if it conflicted with the vocational assistance statute.
3Id.
4 Id. n.3. The amended ORS 656.283 no longer provides for Board review of a
director's vocational assistance decisions.
55Id. at 2269. The dissent argues that the arbitrary nature of disallowing certain
acknowledged impairments has the effect of disregarding prescribed statutory authority.
S6Id. at 2270.
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director's rule did not violate the applicable statute However, unlike
the Board, the Court of Appeals concluded that "the Board does have
the authority to review the validity of a director's rule to determine if
it is consistent with applicable statutes." ' [emphasis added] The entire
discussion by the court about this rule was less than half a page, and
reads as follows:
The Supreme Court held in Nutbrown v. Munn, 311 Or. 328,
346, 811 P.2d. 131 (1991), cert. den. 502 U.S. 1030, 112 S.Ct. 867, 116
L.Ed.2d 773 (1992), that "[a]lthough it is an authority to be exercised
infrequently, and always with care, Oregon administrative agencies
have the power to declare statutes and rules unconstitutional." While
the issue here is not a constitutional question, the reason for the court's
holding in Nutbrown applies equally in this context. Administrative
agencies, including those with quasi-judicial power, are required to
follow the law. If the agency concludes that an administrative rule that
it must apply is not in accordance with a statute or is unconstitutional
it must follow the superior rather than the subordinate law. It would be
an unnecessary limitation of the agency's role for it blindly to apply a
rule that is inconsistent with a statute or constitutional provision. See
Hadleyv. Cody Hindman Logging, 144 Or.App. 157, 160, 925 P.2d 158
(1996)(so long as the director prescribed a method that is within the
delegation by the legislature, neither we nor the Board may substitute
our own judgment regarding the method of computation); cf Shubert
v. Blue Chips, 151 Or.App. 710, 951 P.2d 172 (1997)(the Board may
not substitute its judgment for that of a director of the Department of
Consumer and Business Services regarding temporary disability
standards)(emphasis supplied). Additionally, "[i]t would be pointless
to reverse an agency for correctly deciding a legal questions on the
ground that the agency should have waited for the reviewing court to
decide the question." Cooper v. Eugene School Dist. No. 4, 301 Or.
385, 364, 723 P.2d 298 (1986), appeal dismissed 480 U.S. 942, 107
S.Ct. 1597, 94 L.Ed.2d 784 (1987).58
Having established the Board's power to review the director's
"Schultz, 151 Or.App. at 730.
"Schultz, 151 Or.App. at 730.
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rule the Schultz court turned to the rule in question. The court
concluded that the director's rule was consistent with applicable
statutes and the statutory formula used to determine Mr. Schultz's
disability award. 9 In conclusion the court affirmed the Board's
decision finding the director's rule in accord with the applicable
statute. °
IV. ANALYSIS
Analysis of this decision presents the difficulty of examining a
very short and cursory opinion. Very little case law is presented to
justify the position taken by the court. Additionally, very little case law
exists in the Nutbrown case to buttress the rationale of the Schultz court.
It appears that the Oregon Court, with minimal support, decided the
issue by applying it's own common sense.
If administrative agencies can rule on constitutional issues, then
there must be an underlying principle to allow such activity. The
Schultz court found the principle by noting that all adjudications require
the following of law, and moreover the law to be followed must be a
superior rather than a subordinate law.6' Therefore, an agency Board,
when faced with a director's rule and the statute upon which the
director's rule is based, can determine if the subordinate law (i.e. the
director's rule) is consistent with the superior law (i.e. the statute).
However, merely stating a basic premise taught in every first
year law school class provides no legal basis for conferring power upon
an agency Board. The mere existence of a superior law in no way
conveys a power to act. For example, Congress has no duty to address
the constitutionality of its laws. Ideally as a society we hope Congress
acts responsibly and in accordance with constitutional law. However,
Congress can pass all the unconstitutional laws it wants to pass without
being required to follow the "superior law." Therefore, the statement
that an agency "must follow the superior law" cannot be an enforceable
proposition unless the agency is given the duty, upon determining if a
director's rule is consistent with the applicable statute, to rule
591d.
601d. at 732.
6 1 d. at 731.
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accordingly. [emphasis added]
Moreover, the court failed to even mention that although
Oregon has conferred constitutional review powers upon its
administrative agencies, this is clearly the minority position. Therefore,
the Schultz opinion becomes even more tenuous when one reflects upon
the weight placed upon the Nutbrown opinion.
Additionally, the Oregon court, without stating as much, has
followed the presumption that an agency will act correctly when acting
within its arena of specialized knowledge. Accordingly, the court finds
it illogical to have an administrative Board decide a rule is consistent
or inconsistent with a statute, and then to bar any subsequent ruling on
the issue. This assertion is more justifiable than the Nutbrown decision
from which Schultz draws its reasoning. The rule that an agency
determination is to be granted great deference was established in the
Chevron decision.62 However, the determination that an administrative
agency should be granted the power to make constitutional
determinations is far from settled.63
The court's language failed to render a decision that has only
one construction. It is unclear if there is an affirmative duty imposed
upon the agency Board to determine if the director's rule is inconsistent
with the statute. The court's phrases "required to follow the law" and
"must follow the superior law" indicate that a requirement has been
imposed upon the agency Board. If this construction is correct then
there could be problems with issues of exhaustion and appeal. As for
the alternative construction, the position that there is no duty imposed
is also defensible. First, the reliance upon Nutbrown, which imposes
no duty to address constitutionality, supports a claim of no duty.
Second, the language "[i]f the agency concludes" can be read as an
indication that the court felt the agency Board could or could not pursue
such an inquiry.
'Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 394 (1984).
63Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 4J, 301 Or. 358, 363, 723 P.2d 298 (noting
"[e]nough judicial opinions have said that agencies cannot pass on the constitutionality of the
laws entrusted to them... .but more recently the proposition has been questioned.).
V. IMPACT
The Schultz decision itself will probably cause no more than a
slight ripple in the ever-rising tide of administrative agency power.
However, besides the cumulative effects of such decisions, there are
several related areas that could be affected.
First, there is the issue of reviewability of an agency
determination. For example, imagine a director's rule establishing a
particular disability award for a specific injury. Parties will proceed
and act in reliance on the rule. If, upon review, a board invalidates the
director's rule both the affected parties and the agency will be faced
with a problem. The rule has been held to be invalid. Is there a prior
rule that can provide some guidance for the agency board? If not,
where else can the board look? Even if there is some guidance, does
the board have the power to "create" a rule when the power has been
conferred upon a particular director? And if the board determines that
it must wait until the director has promulgated a new rule, the parties'
seeking relief will be faced with an undeterminable delay.
Second, there is a potential exhaustion problem. If the board
has a duty to determine if a rule is consistent with a statute the issue
must be raised to ensure that all administrative remedies have been
exhausted. However, if there is no such duty then it will be upon the
parties or the board to address the issue.
VI. CONCLUSION
The administrative agency system is here to stay. On a daily
basis every United States citizen is influenced by an agency action or
decision. The acceptance of this reality has helped agencies evolve into
powerful entities with growing independence. Perhaps the not too
distant future will include agencies acting with complete, unfettered
discretion. If the latest decisions of the 20th century are any indication,
the possibility is a strong one.
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